This After-Action Report uses standard text for the narrative sections describing the events, and black on grey text for historical notes and rules-related comments. In this playtest session I’ve followed the historical decisions and events as long as possible, to test the rules against actual, documented facts. Therefore, don’t be surprised if some decisions or moves aren’t exactly smart.
Please also note that everything described in the narrative sections corresponds either to events that actually occurred during play or to decisions that were genuinely considered. Nothing has been added for embellishment or narrative invention alone.
You may find a detailed description of the upcoming “First Man in Rome” at this link. And remember! Reserve your place in the legions by sending a tablet to the Censor, at info@TRLGames.com !
I, Fabricius Venetus, Centurion of Legio VI Ferrata under the Imperium of Caius Iulius Caesar, set down here an account of those matters which I myself saw, or learned from men worthy of trust, during the civil war in the provinces of Hispania and Gaul.
May, 705 Ab Urbe Condita (March, 49BC)
After securing Rome and all Italy, and compelling Pompey and the senators of the Optimates faction to withdraw into Macedonia, Caesar turned his attention to the western provinces. In Hispania Citerior and Ulterior, Pompey had at his disposal seven legions, some composed of seasoned soldiers, and supported by many local clients.
It should be noted that the Roman calendar at that time, being regulated by the moon, was in advance of the true season by nearly two months. Since considerations of weather and supply are of the greatest importance, the dates assigned to these operations have been adjusted to accord with the actual course of the year.
In the preceding months, Pompey had assigned Lucius Afranius, with five legions, and Marcus Terentius Varro, with two, to hold their respective provinces. These commanders, having little money and receiving no certain intelligence of Pompey’s position, levied as many auxiliaries as they could among the Hispanians and made ready for defence.
Afranius moved his forces to Ilerda, choosing a position secured on the south by a river and covering the passes of the Pyrenees to the east. Varro, being more devoted to letters than to arms, remained in the farther west and did not join his forces with those of Afranius.
At first glance, Afranius’ decision to concentrate his forces at Ilerda may appear questionable, yet it reveals a sound appreciation of both terrain and logistics.
If Caesar were to enter Hispania by the southern route near Emporium, he would be compelled to wheel northward and force a river crossing before bringing Afranius to battle. This would grant Afranius the opportunity to dispute the passage and engage under favourable conditions, with the river serving as a natural defensive line.
If, on the other hand, Caesar chose the northern passes, his advance would lead through a region notably poor in supplies, especially in the winter and early spring months. Such a march would impose severe strain on his army, increasing the likelihood of delay, disorder, and attrition before any engagement could even be offered.
In this light, Ilerda stands not as an arbitrary choice, but as a position that compels the enemy to accept either immediate tactical disadvantage or gradual operational exhaustion.
Meanwhile, the senate of Massilia declared for Pompey, mustered the citizens, and strengthened their numbers with auxiliaries drawn from the neighboring Gallic tribes, making ready to endure a siege. A few days before, Lucius Domitius Enobarbus, long hostile to Caius Iulius Caesar, had come by sea and assumed command of the defence. Against them stood Caius Trebonius, Caesar’s legate, a man experienced in the Gallic wars, who, with three legions, had already begun preparations for the investment of the city.
A civitas libera et foederata such as Massilia enjoyed a privileged status: broad internal autonomy, its own institutions, and most importantly exemption from the standard burdens of provincial taxation. In return, loyalty and cooperation with Rome were expected, though rarely tested under normal circumstances. Civil war, however, blurred these arrangements. Obligations that were clear in times of peace became matters of interpretation, and neutrality was difficult to maintain. Free cities were often compelled to align themselves with one faction or the other, guided as much by interest and patronage as by formal duty.
Massilia offers a textbook example. Though geographically embedded within Caesar’s province of Gallia Transalpina, the city maintained long-standing patron–client ties with Pompey. When conflict broke out, these relationships proved decisive, and Massilia declared in his favour from the outset of the war.
Caius Iulius Caesar, as was his custom, acted with speed. Leaving Rome, he hastened to Massilia, while three veteran legions followed from Italy, expected to join him within a month. At the same time, he ordered his legate Caius Fabius, who lay at Narbo with three legions, to advance into Hispania, contain the Pompeian forces, and await his arrival.
Finding the city strong in its defenses and not easily taken by assault, Caesar resolved upon a siege. He therefore made preparations to cut off the town from the sea and prevent the importation of supplies and reinforcements. For this purpose, Decimus Iunius Brutus was ordered to construct twenty triremes at Narbo and to man them with Gallic auxiliaries, that he might engage and board the enemy vessels should the fleet of the Massiliots venture out.
At the same time, Caesar directed his legions to draw lines of circumvallation about the city, both to strengthen the investment and to wear down the spirit of the defenders.
Assaulting a large, well-fortified city such as Massilia would almost certainly result in heavy losses, something Caesar could ill afford, given the value of his veteran legions. Instead, he adopts a methodical approach: to isolate the city by land and sea, and compel its surrender through starvation rather than direct attack. Under these conditions, the food reserves within the walls are unlikely to last more than three months.
Because surrender may be demanded only once, timing becomes critical. Caesar intends to delay his offer until the defenders are fully aware that no relief is forthcoming and that continued resistance serves no purpose.
To support this strategy, he makes full use of the legions’ engineering capabilities by constructing a circumvallation line, improving both the effectiveness of the siege and the likelihood of a successful surrender. Meanwhile, a small fleet is being prepared to enforce the naval blockade; it will be ready within a month. Manned in part by Gallic auxiliaries, it should give Brutus a distinct advantage if Enobarbus attempts to break the blockade by sea.
While the lines of circumvallation were being completed, the three legions under Publius Vatinius crossed the Alps and arrived at Massilia. Upon their arrival, they took over the conduct of the siege; and the three veteran legions, having finished the works, set out for Hispania under the command of Caius Iulius Caesar.
At the same time, Caius Fabius, with three legions, crossed the Pyrenees. The passage, affording little subsistence for an army—especially in the month of March—required careful preparation. A baggage train, placed in advance under Lucius Decidius Saxa, was stationed within the pass, so that the troops might refresh their supplies as they marched.
After the army had passed, this same train was to move on toward Ilerda, to support operations there; and a second train was prepared for the three legions which were to follow in the next month under Caesar. The provisions for these movements were gathered at Narbo from the fertile districts in its vicinity.
Although Caius Fabius successfully led his army across the Pyrenees, he now found himself in a hostile region, in close proximity to an enemy force, and dependent entirely upon foraging for supplies, since Ilerda remained in the hands of the Pompeians.
The superior cavalry of Lucius Afranius continually harassed the foraging parties, and skirmishes ensued in which losses were suffered on both sides. The provisions gathered under such conditions proved insufficient to sustain the entire army. Yet, despite these difficulties, the discipline of the legionaries held firm. No losses were sustained through desertion or disorder, and the army maintained its cohesion in the face of scarcity and constant enemy pressure.
In the absence of nearby friendly settlements, an army is often compelled to rely on foraging, effectively living off the land, as the alternative of advancing with a baggage train would substantially reduce marching speed and operational flexibility.
The quantity of supplies obtained in this manner is highly variable. It depends on the fertility of the region, the season, the availability of cavalry assigned to protection and collection duties, and the effectiveness of enemy cavalry in disrupting these operations. Even under favourable conditions, however, a productive region can sustain only limited exploitation before its resources are exhausted by the passage of a large army.
The Pompeian commander Lucius Afranius now faced the problem of how to respond to the arrival of the Caesarian army. While he suspected that his opponent was numerically inferior, he could not ignore the fact that it was likely composed of veterans of the Gallic wars, whereas his own forces consisted largely of inexperienced recruits.
He therefore sent out his cavalry to conduct a reconnaissance of the enemy position. The Caesarian horsemen made no effort to screen the army’s dispositions, a circumstance which only deepened Afranius’ suspicion that an ambush was intended, and rendered his own scouts overly cautious in their observations.
The resulting intelligence was consequently imprecise and of limited value: the enemy strength was estimated at approximately 16,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, with a possible margin of error approaching half that number. On the basis of this uncertain information, Afranius resolved to avoid immediate engagement. He chose instead to delay, relying on the expected arrival of the two legions under Marcus Terentius Varro and on the use of his cavalry to harass and restrict the enemy’s supplies.
It was a decision that would prove costly in its consequences.
Roman commanders possessed only limited means by which to assess the strength and composition of an opposing army. Intelligence was typically gathered through spies, light infantry reconnaissance, and inference drawn from marching speeds and logistical activity observed at a distance.
In practice, such information was often incomplete, misleading, or deliberately obscured. An active enemy could easily deny effective reconnaissance, either by concealing movements or by disrupting scouting parties before meaningful observation could be achieved.
In First Man in Rome, cavalry fulfils this dual function. It may be employed in a reconnaissance role, providing uncertain but potentially valuable intelligence on enemy forces, or used to screen one’s own army, denying the opponent comparable information.
Lucius Afranius was likewise forced to contend with growing difficulties in his own supply situation. Although numerically inferior, the cavalry of Caius Fabius succeeded in inflicting losses upon his foraging parties and in disrupting the flow of provisions from the surrounding countryside to the base at Ilerda.
As a result, the available resources in the region around Ilerda began steadily to diminish. The larger Pompeian army, rather than enjoying the advantage of its superior numbers, thus found itself increasingly exposed to the effects of attrition, with its logistical position gradually weakening over time.
June, 705 Ab Urbe Condita (April, 49BC)
With only ten talents remaining in their war chest, the Pompeian governors were compelled to seek additional funds from the provinces and cities under their control.
Caius Gallonius demanded a medium tribute from the free city of Gades. However, since the request came from a man of limited dignitas and auctoritas, the city council refused the demand, while nonetheless choosing to preserve a formally neutral position in the civil war. Unshaken, Gallonius turned instead to the merchants of Hispania Ulterior, from whom he obtained a loan amounting to two talents.
At the same time, Lucius Vibullius Rufus approached the free city of Tarraco with a similar demand for a medium tribute. Despite his modest political standing, the request was accepted, and the city contributed two talents to the Pompeian cause.
At the outbreak of the civil war, both Caesar and Pompey possessed substantial war treasuries; yet a conflict of this scale proved extraordinarily expensive, and liquidity rapidly became a limiting factor.
Beyond the taxation of controlled provinces, several methods were available to raise additional funds. The most common were requests for tribute from free cities and loans from merchant communities. In practice, however, the distinction between “request” and coercion was often indistinct. The political standing of the issuer, the proximity of armed forces, and existing local sympathies all influenced the outcome. Failure to judge these factors correctly could push a city—or even an entire province—toward the opposing faction, particularly if demands were excessive or repeatedly imposed.
A more direct and violent option was the sack of a captured city. This was employed only rarely during the civil war, as it carried significant reputational consequences within the Roman world. In game terms, it results in a loss of Clementia and a shift in the alignment of the affected province.
Finally, revenue could be generated through the sale of non-Roman prisoners of war into slavery. This method, however, presupposes a prior military victory, and is therefore dependent upon success on the battlefield before any economic benefit can be realized.
As the Roman forces in Gaul had been significantly reduced by the demands of the civil war, and as reports indicated suspicious movements among the Suebi and the Britanni along the frontier, Caius Iulius Caesar ordered the raising of a new legion in Gallia Transalpina.
The unit was designated Legio XX and placed under the command of Publius Vatinius, a trusted legate. Once its recruits had completed an initial period of training lasting one month, the legion was intended to provide a reliable force for deterring or repelling any barbarian incursions along the frontier.
The risk that external powers might exploit the Roman civil war to raid or invade frontier territories was considerable, and it obliged both factions to maintain effective forces along the borders, or accept the consequences of neglect.
Historically, several such opportunities were indeed seized. The Dalmatae conducted sustained guerrilla operations in Illyricum; Pharnaces II of Pontus invaded Anatolia in 48 BC; and Egypt, formerly a client kingdom, revolted against Roman authority in the same year.
In First Man in Rome, additional actors may likewise attempt to exploit the instability: the Britanni across the Channel, the Germanic Suebi, the Gallaeci of Hispania, various Gallic tribes, and even the Parthian Kingdom in the East.
After a second baggage train had been dispatched across the Pyrenees, Caius Iulius Caesar, together with the three legions stationed at Narbo, also crossed the mountain pass and joined Caius Fabius near Ilerda.
Caesar’s force now amounted to six veteran legions, six thousand cavalry, and two thousand Gallic auxiliaries. In response, Lucius Afranius, aware that the loss of Ilerda would imperil his entire position in Hispania Citerior, resolved to accept battle with five legions, seven thousand cavalry, and four thousand Hispanic auxiliaries.
As the opposing lines engaged, apprehension began to spread among the Pompeian ranks, and the less experienced troops gradually gave way. Recognizing that his army could not match the steadiness and experience of Caesar’s veterans, Afranius ordered a withdrawal.
The retreat soon turned disorderly. The Pompeians left approximately two thousand dead on the field, and a further five thousand were taken or surrendered during the pursuit, requesting clemency. Caesar granted pardon to the captured soldiers, allowing them to return home on condition that they relinquish their arms and swear never again to take them up against him.
Shortly thereafter, a delegation from the council of Ilerda arrived and delivered the keys of the city into Caesar’s hands. Defeated in battle and with his army in a state of growing demoralization, Lucius Afranius withdrew in haste beyond the river Hebrus. His intention was to effect a junction with the two Pompeian legions in Hispania Ulterior, then under the command of Marcus Terentius Varro.
A battle may be resolved either through Strategic Combat—faster, yet still accounting for the essential variables—or through Tactical Combat, which models the engagement in full detail. In both cases, the outcome is strongly shaped by the composition of the forces involved, their morale, their experience, and the quality of their commanders.
In this instance, Strategic Combat was employed. Despite numerical inferiority, Caesar secured victory through two decisive advantages: superior command ability and the proven cohesion, discipline, and morale of his veteran legions. Lucius Afranius possessed only a limited counterweight in the form of numerical superiority in skirmishers, but this proved insufficient to alter the balance of the engagement. To his credit, Afranius recognized the unfavourable situation in time and executed an orderly withdrawal, thereby avoiding the complete destruction of his force.
As in the historical record, the aftermath saw widespread surrender and desertion. The common soldier was rarely motivated by abstract political ideals such as “preserving the Republic” or “defending the dignitas” of others. More immediate incentives, such as loyalty to the commander, prospects of plunder, and the expectation of payment or land upon discharge, were far more decisive. When faced with an opponent renowned for clemency, surrender or even defection became a rational course of action.
A clear example of this dynamic occurred shortly after the battle of Ilerda, when Pompeian troops surrendered en masse, including veterans, and complained that they had not received their pay. Remarkably, Caesar raised the required funds among his own soldiers and used them to pay and subsequently incorporate the former enemies into his army.
At the same time, having completed the construction of twenty triremes at Narbo, Decimus Iunius Brutus sailed for Massilia in order to establish a naval blockade.
Upon sighting the Caesarian fleet near the harbour entrance, Lucius Domitius Enobarbus resolved to act without delay in an attempt to break the encirclement. He therefore led eighteen triremes out of the port and engaged the enemy at sea.
Brutus made effective use of the two thousand Gallic auxiliaries embarked aboard his vessels, employing both boarding actions and incendiary attacks. The Massiliot fleet was steadily overwhelmed; by the fall of evening, most of their ships had been sunk or disabled, and Enobarbus himself drowned during the fighting. With the blockade now firmly established, the siege conducted by Caius Trebonius began to take its toll on the defenders. Many were killed by arrows and the missiles from the siege engines, while others slipped out of the city under cover of night to surrender to the besieging forces.
The effectiveness of a siege, the likelihood of a city’s surrender, is determined by a range of interacting factors. Among the most important are the size and defensive capacity of the city, the relative strength of the opposing forces, the presence of siege engines and circumvallation works, and the morale of the defenders. Equally significant are the reputation and perceived clemency of the besieger, as well as the degree to which the city is isolated by a naval or land blockade.
July, 705 Ab Urbe Condita (May, 49BC)
Having secured supplies and recruited additional Hispanic auxiliaries at Ilerda, Caius Iulius Caesar advanced with haste in pursuit of Lucius Afranius, who was then regrouping at Saguntum.
Upon learning of Caesar’s approach, Afranius attempted to avoid engagement, but the condition of his army, fatigued and disorganized, prevented any rapid or orderly redeployment. In the end, the mere sight of the pursuing enemy compelled the Pompeians to continue their withdrawal westward by forced march, abandoning wounded men and stragglers along the route.
Saguntum surrendered its gates to Caesar without resistance, after which he immediately resumed the pursuit through Hispania Citerior. Despite the efforts of his legionaries, he was unable to bring Afranius to battle before the Pompeian commander reached Corduba, where he succeeded in joining forces with Marcus Terentius Varro.
Every withdrawal exerts a direct effect upon an army’s cohesion, increasing casualties, undermining morale, and raising its level of disruption, while also reducing its capacity to react effectively to new threats.
Given sufficient time, such a force might restore order, re-establish discipline, and recover its operational effectiveness. Caesar, however, has no intention of granting any such respite.
Meanwhile in Britannia, the fugitive Gallic leader Commius, acting in open betrayal, persuaded Cassivellaunus and the Britanni to strike against the territories of the Remi and Pictones, tribes which had submitted to Caius Iulius Caesar and now stood under the protection of Roman arms and law.
Cassivellaunus and Commius assembled a force of approximately ten thousand warriors and sixty ships, landing near Gesoriacum and advancing toward Durocortorum, intending to plunder the largely undefended town and its surrounding countryside.
As previously noted, Caesar had already ordered his legate Publius Vatinius to raise Legio XX in Gallia Transalpina and move swiftly to secure the territory of the Remi against any hostile incursion. Vatinius executed these instructions without delay and, by the month of June, had joined forces with the Gallic auxiliaries under Quintus Fabius Maximus.
The combined force reacted rapidly to the Britanni incursion and intercepted Cassivellaunus beneath the walls of Durocortorum. At the sight of Roman legionaries, the Britanni abandoned their intended raid and withdrew in haste.
Vatinius pursued them to the coast, where the Britanni, unable to re-embark and escape by sea, retreated instead toward the estuaries of the Sequana river, hoping to reunite with their fleet. Vatinius pressed the pursuit and ultimately brought them to battle.
Cassivellaunus attempted to contest the crossing of the river, but Vatinius secured the passage in advance of the enemy. A battle followed, in which the Romans easily repelled the attacks of the war chariots, while the Britanni, exhausted from forced marches, were unable to maintain cohesion or execute an orderly withdrawal.
The engagement ended in a rout. The survivors were cut down or taken; Cassivellaunus himself was executed, as clemency was deemed inappropriate toward those who had violated treaty-bound allies. The remaining prisoners were sold into slavery.
The Britanni are one of several enemy kingdoms and tribal powers represented in First Man in Rome, each defined by its own strategic objectives, constraints, and operational limitations.
Once activated, a Power is assigned to one of the two factions according to specific control rules designed to ensure that, whenever possible, it acts in accordance with its own interests, typically by targeting the Roman faction whose sphere of influence overlaps with its region of concern.
This design is intended to create a dynamic and reactive strategic environment in which non-player forces do not behave as neutral obstacles, but as active political and military actors – even though the Britanni failed miserably this time.
August, 705 Ab Urbe Condita (June, 49BC)
The Pompeians, in need of gold to replace recent losses, undertook a review of the taxes and properties belonging to merchants, enterprises, and cities across Hispania. Through a mixture of dubious accounting and fortunate discovery, they concluded that several communities could in fact contribute far more to their cause than previously assessed.
With no alternative means of raising the required funds, they pressed the matter further, demanding an additional tribute from the free city of Gades, as well as further loans from both provinces under their control.
The council of Gades, wearied by repeated extortion attempts, expelled Caius Gallonius from the city and declared for Caesar. The merchants of Hispania Citerior, likewise exhausted by continuous demands, mobilised their clients and friends; in several cases entire communities likewise declared openly for Caesar, bringing the province effectively under his control.
As noted earlier, the extraction of additional funds from provinces, free cities, or client communities may produce significant political repercussions, particularly when the affected populations are not favourably aligned. In this instance, the event card A Small Oversight permits the Optimates to remove up to two Loan or Tribute markers, thereby reducing the risk of adverse consequences in subsequent financial demands.
In practice, however, the preceding pressure proved counterproductive. The attempt to raise further tribute triggered a full provincial realignment: Hispania Citerior shifted its allegiance to the Populares under Caesar. As a result, all cities within the province that were previously under Pompeian control and left without garrisons transferred to Caesarian authority.
Consequently, Caesar now holds effective control over the majority of settlements in Hispania Citerior, and thus over the province as a whole. It is important to distinguish between alignment and control: a province may remain politically aligned with one faction while being physically controlled by the other, depending on the disposition of its cities and garrisons.
In Massilia, with the city garrison now severely weakened after three months of siege, Caius Trebonius judged that the moment had come to demand surrender.
He therefore sent a formal summons to the city council, setting out in detail the superiority of his forces, the completed circumvallation works, the naval blockade, and the impossibility of any relief reaching the city in the foreseeable future. He further emphasized his intention to spare the city and its inhabitants from retribution, should they submit without further resistance.
Confronted with the reality of their situation and reassured by these terms, the Massiliots finally capitulated. The city militia was disbanded, and the Gallic auxiliaries serving in the garrison were permitted to return to their tribes, on condition that they would never again bear arms against Caius Iulius Caesar. Trebonius left one legion as a garrison and proceeded with the remaining two toward Narbo.
The siege of Massilia was among the largest and most protracted of the late Republican period, and it absorbed a significant quantity of manpower and material that might otherwise have been deployed on other fronts.
As in other cases, the city may be under Caesarian control while remaining politically aligned with the Optimates. This distinction carries practical consequences: a substantial garrison must be maintained to prevent unrest, suppress potential revolts, and discourage any reversal of allegiance should the strategic situation change.
In the meantime, Caius Iulius Caesar advanced into Hispania Ulterior. The XIV Legion under Caius Fabius was ordered to march on Toletum and establish a forward supply base, ensuring a continuous flow of provisions to the main army, while Caesar himself prudently advanced toward Corduba, the principal stronghold of the Pompeian forces.
In truth, Caesar’s intent was to present Lucius Afranius with a calculated opportunity: upon learning that the Caesarian forces had been divided, Afranius might perceive this as his best, and perhaps only, chance to force a decisive engagement. Such a battle would allow Caesar to avoid a prolonged pursuit across the vast territories of Hispania Ulterior and bring the campaign to a swift conclusion.
Afranius, though not unaware of the possibility of deception, found himself unable to dismiss the offer. He therefore marched out, leaving no garrison at Corduba, and offered battle with his seven legions.
Caesar, observing that his troops were eager for action, immediately accepted the engagement.
Caius Iulius Caesar, though numerically inferior, relied upon the superior discipline and morale of his legionaries. He advanced with his infantry concentrated in the centre, supported on the right wing by the formidable German cavalry under Quintus Pedius, with the intention of breaking the enemy line at its core.
Lucius Afranius, by contrast, extended his formation along a wider front, placing his veteran troops on the right wing in the expectation of achieving a rapid breakthrough there, and subsequently enveloping the Caesarian line from the rear. He also retained six cohorts in reserve, intended to reinforce the centre should his less experienced recruits prove unable to withstand the initial assault.
Every army possesses a threshold beyond which cohesion collapses and rout becomes likely. This threshold is represented by the Rout Level, which is modified by faction morale, army composition, and the quality of leadership in the field.
The resulting adjusted Rout Level is expressed as a percentage of total army strength, producing the Rout Value: the amount of losses a force can sustain before panic begins to spread and individual units start to break and flee.
In the present case, Afranius’ comparatively large army has a Rout Value of 16, whereas Caesar, despite commanding a smaller force, benefits from superior morale and leadership, resulting in a slightly lower but more resilient value of 15.
Both armies advanced with determination. As Caesar’s legions drew near, the Hispanic slingers in the service of Lucius Afranius discharged a heavy volley of lead bullets, their most effective weapon. Though the legionaries were protected by their shields, some missiles found their mark, and Caesar himself was struck, though not seriously wounded. According to their custom, the slingers withdrew immediately after delivering their volley, avoiding close combat.
Meanwhile, in accordance with Caesar’s orders, the legionaries continued their advance in good order, refraining from casting their pila and preserving them for the decisive moment against the enemy infantry.
The engagement began on Caesar’s left, where Lucius Decidius Saxa had instructed his Gallic skirmishers to hold their ground and delay the enemy cavalry.
As the lines closed, a further volley from the Balearic slingers inflicted additional losses. Then, at close range, both sides hurled their pila and immediately engaged in hand-to-hand combat.
Because the Pompeians had left intervals in their ranks to allow their skirmishers to withdraw, Caesar’s line maintained a more compact and cohesive formation. By virtue of this, and of their greater experience, the veteran legionaries, despite the losses suffered in the advance, began to press hard upon the enemy and throw their line into disorder.
A key concept in melee combat is Weight: the number of men who are actually able to engage in the front rank and, especially in close-order formations, the extent to which rear ranks can effectively support the fight.
Classical heavy infantry such as the Greek hoplite, the Macedonian phalanx, and the Roman legion were all specifically trained and organized to maximize this advantage, ensuring that as many men as possible contributed to the fighting at the point of contact.
By contrast, a disordered mass, regardless of its numerical strength, can bring only a limited portion of its troops to bear at any given moment, greatly reducing its effective combat power.
At the same time, the cavalry under Quintus Pedius fell upon the enemy’s left flank, first casting their javelins and then pressing the attack at close quarters. A portion of the Hispanic auxiliaries, struck with fear at the cries and onset of the German horse, abandoned their position and fled.
On Caesar’s left, the Pompeian cavalry succeeded in routing the Gallic skirmishers; yet, in doing so, they were thrown into considerable disorder by the missiles they had received. Lucius Decidius Saxa, observing this, advanced with two cohorts of the XIV Legion, which he had held in reserve for such an occasion, and repelled the attack.
In the centre, Caius Iulius Caesar, perceiving that the enemy line was wavering, seized the opportunity without delay. Moving along the ranks, he encouraged his men and urged them to press forward before Lucius Afranius could restore order. The legionaries, animated by his presence, renewed the struggle with greater force, broke into the Pompeian line, and drove it steadily backward.
Another key element of tactical combat is Opportunity Activation, which allows a commander with a high Strategic Rating to intervene at a decisive moment and act ahead of the enemy’s intentions.
In this case, Caesar exploited this advantage to renew the assault in the centre at precisely the critical point, denying Afranius the time needed to commit his second line of legionaries and stabilize the front.
With his centre giving way, Lucius Afranius was compelled to intervene before panic spread throughout the line. Placing himself before the fleeing troops and appealing to their sense of duty and honour, he succeeded in rallying a portion of them and restoring a measure of order.
Meanwhile Caesar, observing that his legionaries, though victorious, were fatigued and somewhat disordered, halted the advance and reformed the ranks. The cohorts from the rear were brought forward, allowing those who had borne the brunt of the fighting to recover.
At the same time, Quintus Pedius pressed forward on the right with his Germanic cavalry, routing additional enemy troops and exposing the flank of the Pompeian line.
Perceiving the danger on his left, Marcus Terentius Varro advanced two cohorts from the VII Legion to close the gap and confront the cavalry. The German horse, however, withdrew in good order, avoiding engagement.
Even for a strong cavalry unit, a frontal melee against legionaries is probably a bad idea. Cavalry and skirmishers may be able to avoid a slower enemy trying to engage by pulling back. This could cost an increase in attrition and maybe some pride, but it allows to live and fight another day.
As the course of the battle turned increasingly against him, Afranius shifted his skirmishers to the right, seeking to reinforce Marcus Petreius and, if possible, to break the enemy line at that point; yet this effort produced no immediate result. At the same time, he drew two additional cohorts from his reserve and sent them to strengthen his left flank.
Meanwhile, Caesar continued to restore order in the centre, preparing his legions for a renewed advance. On the right, Quintus Pedius overcame the remaining enemy cavalry and made ready his Germanic auxiliaries for a decisive charge.
As losses mounted and fugitives increased, Afranius perceived that the morale of his army was nearing collapse. He therefore attempted to organize a withdrawal; but, owing to the confusion of the field and the disorder already spreading through his ranks, he was unable to execute it in any coherent manner.
The Pompeian army has already 13 Size Points of losses from casualties and routed units, with a further 4 likely to be incurred at the end of the turn, enough to exceed its Rout Value of 16.
At that stage, the risk of a general collapse becomes critical, and things can quickly escalate into a full-scale rout and a massacre. Under such conditions, attempting a Retreat During Combat is often the more prudent option. Its success, however, is far from guaranteed: it depends heavily on the Strategic Rating of the commanding general, as well as on the availability of sufficient cavalry to screen the withdrawal and prevent the enemy from turning disorder into destruction.
On Caesar’s left wing, the enemy at last succeeded in bending the resistance of Lucius Decidius Saxa; but the success came too late to affect the outcome. Under the combined pressure of the Caesarian legions in the centre and the Germanic cavalry on their exposed flank, the Pompeians gave way. Their morale collapsed, and the army was driven into rout.
Caesar’s cavalry pressed hard upon the fleeing enemy, inflicting heavy losses and capturing many thousands. The remnants of Afranius’ army withdrew toward the fortified city of Corduba, abandoning their wounded and suffering further losses through desertion along the march.
Caesar, lamenting what he regarded as a needless sacrifice of Roman lives, granted clemency to those who surrendered. The former enemies saluted him as Imperator and were admitted into his ranks.
Overcome by the defeat and the loss of more than ten thousand legionaries, Afranius took his own life shortly after reaching Corduba. Command then passed to Marcus Petreius who, seeing no prospect of recovery and no purpose in prolonging the struggle, surrendered the city to Caesar as he approached.
Thus the campaign in Hispania was brought to an end, and Caesar was free to turn his forces toward Macedonia to confront Pompey.